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Abstract 
Invisibility is defined as a lack of individuation of or lack of differentiation between 
group members, and is evident in poor recognition of individual faces. The current work tests the 
hypothesis that the non-prototypicality of Black women’s race and gender results in their 
‘‘invisibility” relative to White women and Black and White men. Studies 1 and 2 hypothesized 
that invisibility would be highest when Black women were depicted as non-prototypical of their 
race and/or gender groups, but reduced when more prototypical of the group “women” and/or 
“Black.” To manipulate prototypicality, Study 1 varied the numerical representation of Black 
women within the group “women” to be low (10 out of 80 photos in an array) or equal relative to 
White women, and Study 2 varied the trait overlap of Black women to be low (25%) or high 
(75%) relative to White women and/or Black men. Invisibility was measured by a subsequent 
face recognition task. Rather than invisibility being reduced under conditions of equal numerical 
representation and high trait overlap, the direct opposite occurred: Low numerical representation 
and low trait overlap increased recognition of faces. Studies 3 and 4 tested alternative 
explanations. Study 3 addressed the possibility that the women in Study 1 looked powerful by 
manipulating perceived power of the women in the photo array (labeled as “secretaries” or 
“managers”). There was no evidence that power played a role. Study 4 tested the hypothesis that 
Studies 1 and 2 primed a focus on how Black women are different or unique compared to White 
women and Black men in the low numerical representation and trait overlap conditions. As 
predicted, participants who were procedurally primed to focus on similarities were worse at 
recognizing Black women in a subsequent face recognition task. This effect was attenuated 
among participants who were procedurally primed to focus on differences. Mirroring the results 
of Study 1 and 2, Study 4 suggested a difference focus can lead to a reduction in use of category 
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based information and an increased use of individuating information, reducing invisibility. 
Implications for reduction of invisibility are discussed.  
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(In)visibility of Black women: Drawing attention to individuality  
Research on stereotyping and discrimination typically focuses on White women as the 
targets of sexism and Black men as the targets of racism. The current work examines invisibility 
as a form of discrimination that may characterize groups that do not fit these prototypes – e.g., 
Black women. Recently, social psychological researchers have suggested that the relative non-
prototypicality of Black women’s race and gender results in their “invisibility” relative to White 
women and to Black and White men (Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008; Sesko & Biernat, 2010). 
Psychologists have conceptualized invisibility as a lack of representation or misrepresentation of 
a social group (e.g., Fryberg & Townsend, 2008), and also as a lack of individuation of or lack of 
differentiation between group members (Sesko & Biernat, 2010). Invisibility as a form of 
discrimination is argued to be evident in perceivers’ treatment of Black women as 
interchangeable and indistinguishable, such that their individual voices and faces go unnoticed 
and unheard (Sesko & Biernat, 2010).  
While social psychologists have begun to discuss invisibility as a unique form of 
discrimination, there is a lack of clarity and consensus about what the term actually means and 
what its antecedents and consequences might be. The current work directly examines non-
prototypicality as an antecedent of invisibility by investigating if increasing the prototypicality of 
Black women as “Women” and/or “Black” subsequently increases their visibility relative to 
White women, Black men, and White men for White perceivers. In addition, a second goal of 
this work is to examine methods to reduce invisibility; to increase the likelihood that Black 
women will be differentiated and individuated.  
What is Invisibility?  
                                                                                                                                                      2 
 
 Invisibility has been discussed in a variety of literatures. In the studies reported here, the 
focus is on perceivers’ treatment of others as invisible. However, the bulk of the discourse on 
invisibility has been on experiences of invisibility. Below, I review literature related to 
experiences of invisibility before turning to perceptions of invisibility. While there is no single, 
concrete, accepted definition of invisibility, one thing many of these literatures have in common 
is an emphasis on intersectionality among different social categories as a contributor to the 
phenomenon.  
Intersectionality and the History of Invisibility in Feminist Literature 
 Feminists and critical race theorists have argued for some time that it is essential that 
intersections among social group memberships—in particular gender, race/ethnicity, class, and 
sexuality—are taken into account when understanding the experiences and perceptions of 
members of social groups (see Cole, 2009 for a review). Proponents of intersectionality research 
argue that those who deviate from “traditional boundaries” (i.e., White, male, middle/upper class, 
heterosexual) of race, gender, class, and sexuality tend to not be represented within societal 
structures and politics, and this is particularly so for individuals with two or more subordinate 
statuses (e.g., Black women; Crenshaw, 1994; King, 1988). Because of this, resources that are 
readily available for dominant group members are not available for, or more importantly do not 
meet the specific needs of, individuals with subordinate statuses. In this sense they are 
marginalized or “invisible.” In 1970, Beale discussed intersectionality in the form of “double 
jeopardy” or a “double hit” of racism and sexism in Black women’s experiences. Thus the 
agenda for intersectionality theorists and researchers has been to bring the needs of individuals 
with intersecting subordinate statuses to the forefront of discourse on issues associated with 
discrimination, particularly (but not limited to) racism and sexism.  
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 Most of this literature has concentrated on Black women in particular, and on the 
historical invisibility of Black women in the United States (e.g., Davis, 1983; Crenshaw, 
1989/1993, 1994; hooks, 1981; Hammonds, 1986/1995; King, 1988). This is nicely illustrated in 
a classic collection of Black feminist thought assembled by Beverly Guy-Sheftall (1995). Within 
this collection a theme emerges in which Black women’s experiences in groups addressing social 
problems (civil rights movements, feminist groups, violence against women, awareness of 
sexually transmitted diseases, etc.) are described with terms such as “non-existent,” “non-
participating,” “missing persons,” “ignored,” “marginalized,” and “invisible” (e.g., Combahee 
River Collection, 1977/1995; Hammonds, 1986/1995, King, 1988; Lorde, 1984/1995). In fact, 
King (1988) discusses the theoretical (or conceptual) invisibility of Black women, arguing that 
Black women have been left out of discourses on racism and sexism. One of the over-arching 
arguments in this collection as well as other prominent pieces within the feminist literature is that 
historically, discussions of racism have focused on Black men while discussions of sexism have 
focused on White women (e.g., Davis, 1983; Crenshaw, 1994; hooks, 1981; King, 1988). As a 
result, strategies to reduce racism and sexism have failed to acknowledge Black women’s status 
within these groups, and Black women’s dual subordinate status has been overlooked. Further, 
by lumping Black women under the categories of “Black” and “women” without acknowledging 
their unique status as Black women, discrimination reduction agendas have failed to adequately 
capture the experiences of Black women. In this sense they have been missing, or invisible, in 
these discourses (King, 1988).  
 Historically, this sort of invisibility is quite evident. For example, White 19
th
 century 
feminists, including Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, chose to promote the 
interests of White women over commitment to suffrage for all women (Davis, 1983; hooks, 
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1981). This is illustrated in Sojourner Truth’s famous quote, “Ain’t I a woman” at a woman’s 
rights convention in 1851. Further, while Black men gained political leverage in the suffrage and 
civil rights movements, Black women were routinely left out (Davis, 1983; hooks, 1981). As bell 
hooks (1981) notes:  
 “No other group in America has so had their identity socialized out of existence as have 
 black women. We are rarely recognized as a group separate and distinct from black men, 
 or as a present part of the larger group “women” in this culture. When black people are 
 talked about, sexism militates against the acknowledgement of the interests of black 
 women; when women are talked about racism militates against a recognition of black 
 female interests. When black people are talked about the focus tends to be on black men; 
 and when women are talked about the focus tends to be on white women” (p. 7).  
Crenshaw (1994) argues that the lack of civil rights and feminist movements’ acknowledgment 
of intersections of race and gender has had the political consequence of denying women of color 
leverage within these movements. Thus, as King (1988) states, “conceptual invisibility has led to 
the actual strategic neglect and physical exclusion or nonparticipation of black women” (p. 58).  
Invisibility in Psychological Research  
 While the significance of the invisibility of Black women is clear in the feminist and 
critical race literature, psychologists have only recently begun to integrate this idea into 
stereotyping and discrimination research. Interestingly however, one of the first mentions of 
invisibility as a form of discrimination appears in clinical psychology as the invisibility syndrome 
and the emphasis is on Black males rather than Black females. 
 The invisibility syndrome refers to the “struggle with inner feelings and beliefs that 
personal talents, abilities, and character are not acknowledged or valued by others, nor by the 
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larger society, because of racial prejudice” (Franklin & Boyd-Franklin, 2000, p. 33, also see 
Franklin, 1999). As African-Americans repeatedly face racial prejudice they begin to feel as if 
their personal characteristics are not seen or valued. To overcome this invisibility, behaviors that 
increase visibility such as anger, frustration focused on racial injustices, internalized rage, 
depression, substance abuse, and violence are likely to occur. Franklin and Boyd-Franklin draw 
on Ralph Ellison’s (1947/1980) literary classic, Invisible Man, in which an African American 
man struggles with being heard and seen in a racially prejudiced society. They argue that this 
sort of psychological invisibility is particularly true for Black men rather than Black women. 
Their rationale is that Black males are more likely to face persistent social marginalization, and 
to experience social and health risk factors relative to Black women.  
Likewise, Sidanius and Pratto’s (1999) subordinate-male target hypothesis argues that 
subordinate males, rather than subordinate females, are primary objects of discrimination. Thus, 
Black females are expected to experience the same life outcomes as White females, but Black 
men bear the brunt of racial bias. As evidence for this claim, Sidanius and Pratto (1999) analyzed 
U.S. census data starting in 1949 and found that controlling for education, the income ratio 
between Blacks and Whites has improved. But improvement has been greater for women than 
men – that is, the difference in income between Black and White women has been smaller since 
the 1940s than the difference between Black and White men. Franklin and Boyd-Franklin’s 
conceptualization of invisibility and the subordinate-male target hypothesis at first glance seem 
at odds with the current conceptualization of invisibility. However, I argue that instead they are 
quite compatible, but focus on different aspects of discrimination. Like Franklin and Boyd-
Franklin and the subordinate-male target hypothesis, I suggest that Black women are not subject 
to the same discrimination as Black men, and in fact may be targets of less “typical” 
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discrimination. However, as I will explain in more detail, invisibility of Black women is a 
qualitatively different form of discrimination particular to Black women, not their Black male 
and White female counterparts.  
 Fryberg and Townsend (2008) recently expanded this discussion of the psychology of 
invisibility, focusing particularly on the experiences of American Indians (Fryberg & Townsend, 
2008). These authors define invisibility as absence of or erroneous representations of oppressed 
groups and/or individuals. Invisible groups or individuals may be misrepresented or not 
represented at all (Fryberg & Townsend, 2008). In the case of misrepresentation, relative 
invisibility occurs such that the group representation is erroneous or outdated (e.g., sports 
mascots, cartoon characters such as Pocahontas). As a result, individuals must negotiate the fit of 
these representations to their self-concept and identity. Such representations have been shown to 
affect self-esteem, lower feelings of community worth, and limit perceptions of possible 
achievement-related identities (Fryberg, Markus, Oyserman, & Stone, 2008). The psychological 
outcomes of relative invisibility are in line with those suggested by Franklin & Boyd-Franklin’s 
(2000) invisibility syndrome and are nicely represented in Ellison’s famous quote from Invisible 
Man (1947/1980): 
“I am invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to see me. Like the bodiless 
heads you see sometimes in circus sideshows, it is as though I have been surrounded by 
mirrors of hard, distorting glass. When they approach me they see only my surroundings, 
themselves, or figments of their imagination – indeed, everything and anything except 
me” (p. 3). 
In the case of absolute invisibility, Fryberg and Townsend (2008) argue that there are no 
representations of a particular group in the context being discussed. For example, some groups 
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are non-existent in history books, in media representations, or in a profession. Because there is 
no representation, individuals belonging to this group lack schemas on “ways to be” and “ways 
not to be.” The lack of representation communicates where they do not belong but does not 
communicate where they do belong, rendering them invisible in that social context.  
 In a recent theoretical paper, social psychologists Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach (2008) 
bring the analysis of invisibility back to the context of intersectionality. They argue that the 
combination of androcentrism (the tendency to define men as the prototypical standard), 
ethnocentrism (the tendency to define the norms of one’s social group as the prototypical 
standard [e.g., White as dominant; DeVos & Banaji, 2005]), and heterocentrism (heterosexuality 
as the prototypical standard) causes individuals with multiple-subordinate group identities to be 
defined as non-prototypical, and thus subject to what they term intersectional invisibility. Purdie-
Vaughns and Eibach argue that due to androcentrism and heterocentrism, a prototypical ethnic 
minority is male and heterosexual; due to androcentrism and ethnocentrism a prototypical 
gay/bisexual individual is White and male; and due to androcentrism and ethnocentrism a 
prototypical female is White and heterosexual. Thus, members of multiple subordinate-group 
identities, such as Black women, diverge from these prototypes and are subject to different 
outcomes than their more prototypical counterparts. These differences can accrue in the form of 
advantages or disadvantages. Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach (2008) argue that one potential 
advantage is that less prototypical subordinate group members are less likely to be targets of 
discrimination than more prototypical members (e.g., Black men; see also Sidanius and Pratto, 
1999). However, a disadvantage is that non-prototypical subordinate group members struggle to 
be visible and have their voices heard, and are thus more likely to be marginalized (also see 
King, 1988).  
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 Perceiving others as invisible. These conceptualizations of invisibility have focused 
primarily on the experiences of individuals who find themselves marginalized. This literature 
highlights the importance of invisibility for individuals, and for researchers interested in 
understanding the  phenomenon. However, embedded in this analysis is the assumption that 
individual belonging to multiple-subordinate group identities are perceived by others as non-
prototypical group members and thus are subject to outcomes related to invisibility. Thus while 
the experiences of invisibility are certainly valid and important for psychologists to consider, 
understanding how perceptions by dominant group members (e.g., Whites) guide the treatment 
of group members belonging to multiple-subordinate groups is also important.  
In recent work, Monica Biernat and I addressed whether Black women are perceived as 
invisible by Whites (Sesko & Biernat, 2010). We conceptualized invisibility as a lack of 
individuation of or lack of differentiation among group members (see Sesko & Biernat, 2010). 
Specifically, we argued that invisibility is evident in perceivers’ treatment of non-prototypical 
group members as interchangeable and indistinguishable, relative to more prototypical members. 
We do not suggest that Black women are literally invisible, such that they are literally not seen 
and literally not heard. Much research suggests that gender, race, and age are quickly encoded 
and used in judgments upon encountering individuals (Allport, 1954; Brewer, 1988; Devine, 
1989; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Talyor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978), and thus we assume 
that when a Black woman enters a room, perceivers can readily “see” her and encode her as 
Black and female. Instead, invisibility is evident if Black women’s faces and voices are less 
readily distinguished from each other than are those of Black men, White women, and White 
men. 
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 In two studies we addressed whether Black women go “unnoticed” and their voices 
“unheard,” by examining memory for Black women’s faces and speech contributions (Sesko & 
Biernat, 2010). In Study 1, we adapted Shepard’s (1967) basic memory paradigm by exposing 
participants to a series of photos depicting Black/White women and men. In a second phase, 
participants were shown the same photos along with foils and were asked to indicate “old” if 
they had seen the photo before, or “new” if not. We hypothesized and found that participants 
were the least sensitive (in signal detection terms, correctly distinguishing between “new” and 
“old” faces) in identifying Black women compared to the other groups. This paradigm will be the 
primary means of measuring invisibility in the current work.  
 In a second study, we used a “who said what” paradigm (Talyor et al., 1978) to 
investigate memory for the speech contributions of Black women. Participants heard a 
conversation among eight targets (2 Black females, 2 Black males, 2 White females, 2 White 
males), and were later asked to match each statement with the person who said it. We predicted 
and found that Black women were treated as relatively indistinguishable and interchangeable 
such that participants were more likely to incorrectly attribute statements made by Black women 
to other targets than they were to misattribute White women’s, Black men’s, or White men’s 
statements. Further, statements Black women did not say were more likely to be erroneously 
attributed to them relative to the other targets. These studies provide initial support for the 
invisibility hypothesis in that for White perceivers, Black women were seen as relatively 
interchangeable, and their contributions were misattributed to others and others’ comments 
misattributed to them. 
Along with other invisibility researchers (Fryberg & Townsend, 2008; Purdie-Vaughns & 
Eibach, 2008; King 1988), I argue that invisibility is a unique form of discrimination, and 
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suggest that Black women may experience, and be treated with, a qualitatively different form of 
discrimination than their Black male and White female counterparts (see also Hurtado, 1989). 
While the primary theorized antecedent of invisibility has been non-prototypicality (e.g., Purdie-
Vaughns & Eibach, 2008; Sesko & Biernat, 2010), empirical research has not yet tested this 
assumption. Thus the current work builds on Sesko and Biernat (2010) and directly tests the link 
between perceptions of Black women as non-prototypical and subsequent treatment of them as 
invisible. While the focus is on Black women, I also consider invisibility as a more general 
phenomenon applicable to a variety of non-prototypical or similarly situated group members. 
Prototypicality and invisibility 
To understand what is meant by non-prototypicality, it is useful to turn to the extensive 
research literature on prototypes within cognitive psychology. A prototype has been defined as 
the “clearest case” or the “best example” of a category (Rosch, 1975). Specifically, categories 
have an internal structure, or a “general class of conceptions.” Instead of being represented with 
clear-cut boundaries, “items within categories may be considered differentially representative of 
the meaning of the category term” (Rosch, 1975, p.193-194). This internal structure acts as a 
guide or a schema by which perceivers measure the fit of possible group members. As a common 
example, a robin is a more clear case of the category “bird” than a penguin, but they are both 
members of the category. Thus the internal structure defines what represents the prototype or 
best example of a category, and the more deviant a category member is (e.g., penguin) the less 
representative it is of that category (Rosch, 1975; Posner & Keele, 1968, 1970). Stereotypes are 
schemas with an internal structure of the sort described for non-social categories (Cantor & 
Mischel, 1979). Just as the category “bird” is more likely to be represented as a robin than a 
penguin, prototypical representations of “Black” tend to be Black men, not Black women, and 
                                                                                                                                                      11 
 
prototypical representations of “women” tend to be White women rather than Black women (e.g., 
Zárate & Smith, 1990).  
 The extent to which a group member or stimulus is prototypical has been shown to affect 
categorization and memory. For example, in free recall tasks, less prototypical stimuli are 
recalled later than prototypical stimuli (Silvera, Krull, & Sassler, 2002). They are also less likely 
to be recognized compared to prototypical stimuli (Cantor & Mischel, 1977; Posner & Keele, 
1968, 1970) and are less quickly identified as part of that category (Ellis & Nelson, 1999). 
Posner and Keele (1970) have shown that prototypical stimuli are less subject to loss of memory 
after a time delay than less prototypical stimuli. Such effects resemble the current 
conceptualization of invisibility, such that Black women are less likely to be “heard” or “seen” in 
comparison to Black men and White women (Sesko & Biernat, 2010).  
Perceptions of the prototypicality of Black women 
Some research has directly demonstrated that Black women are perceived as non-
prototypical of the groups “Black” and/or “women.” Zárate and Smith (1990) found that White 
participants categorized Black targets more slowly than White targets (by race and gender), but 
especially when the targets were Black women (Study 2). Focusing on the prototypicality of 
gender as it intersects with race, Goff, Thomas, and Jackson (2008) found that participants 
(predominantly White) were less accurate in categorizing the gender of Black women relative to 
White women and Black men (using facial stimuli in Study 1, and silhouettes of people walking 
in Study 2). That is, participants experienced relative difficulty in categorizing Black women as 
women. These researchers also found that perceived “Blackness” was highly associated with 
“maleness” in both Black male and female targets, and as a consequence, Black women were 
rated as less attractive than White women. The association of “Black = male” had an impact on 
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perceptions of Black women as non-prototypical women (i.e., less likely to be categorized as 
women and as attractive).  
 Other research demonstrating the non-prototypicality of Black women relative to their 
Black male and White female counterparts has been descriptive in nature. For example, relative 
to White women, Black women tend to be viewed as more ‘‘masculine” (self-reliant, 
independent, assertive, strong) and also less ‘‘feminine” (emotional, passive, dependent; Binion, 
1990; Goff et al., 2008; Landrine, 1985; Robinson, 1983; West, 1995). And while some 
stereotypes of Black women are consistent with those of Black men (e.g., lazy, hostile, 
uneducated), others are in opposition to these stereotypes (e. g., pleasant/friendly, 
sociable/sociably active; Niemann, Jennings, Rozelle, Baxter, & Sullivan, 1994; see also 
Maddox & Gray, 2002). Not surprisingly then, some researchers have noted that Black males 
tend to be “better” targets than Black females in racism studies investigating commonly used 
stereotypes of African Americans (e.g., Eberhardt, Dasqupta, Banaszynski, 2003; Goff, 
Eberhardt, Williams, & Jackson, 2000).    
Manipulating prototypicality 
  Although non-prototypicality has been the primary theorized antecedent of invisibility 
(e.g., Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008; Sesko & Biernat, 2010), this assumption has not been 
empirically tested. Thus the current work directly tests this assumption by manipulating the 
perceived prototypicality of Black women relative to the group “women” and/or “Black.” 
Prototypicality has been manipulated and studied in a variety of ways, typically with  
stimuli such as shapes or dots (Posner & Keele, 1968, 1970), colors (Rosch, 1973), and other 
non-social objects (Medin, Altom, & Murphy, 1984). In most of this research, categories are 
composed of attributes, and some cases are designed to be more “typical” members of a category 
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than others. To the extent that a case has more of the attributes of the group, it is a more 
prototypical category member. Participants often go through a learning phase where they are 
trained to classify a variety of cases into their appropriate categories, followed by a recognition 
phase that includes the previously learned cases, new variants of these cases, and new cases that 
vary even more from the category (or are non-prototypical). As a general finding, the more 
similar or “typical” of the category the case is the better or faster it is remembered, recognized, 
and/or recalled (Cantor & Mischel, 1977, 1979; Ellis & Nelson, 1999 Posner & Keele, 1968, 
1970; Silvera, et al., 2002). 
The bulk of research involving manipulations of prototypicality has focused on non-
social stimuli; research involving social stimuli has often presumed prototypicality or non-
prototypicality of targets rather than empirically manipulating it (e.g., Goff et al., 2008; Sesko & 
Biernat, 2010). There are, however, a few notable exceptions (e.g., Cantor & Mischel, 1977, 
1979; Mayer & Bower, 1986). Cantor and Mischel (1977, 1979) were interested in how 
preexisting expectations about what traits make up personality prototypes—in this case 
extraverts or introverts—influence memory and impression formation. They argue personality 
traits function as “conceptual prototypes” that help us organize information, which also lead to a 
memory bias for prototype information much in line with work done with non-social stimuli.  
Cantor and Mischel (1979) manipulated prototypicality by varying the “goodness of fit” 
of characters to the personality categories of extraverts or introverts, and also “good Samaritans.” 
Specifically, participants read about three “pure” characters (extraverts, introverts, good 
Samaritans), two “inconsistent” characters (extravert with some introverted characteristics, 
introvert with some extraverted characteristics), and two “mixed” characters (extravert-good 
Samaritan, introvert-good Samaritan). Pure characters were described using nine traits and 
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behaviors that were consistent with the prototype of extraversion or introversion and no traits or 
behaviors that fell within another personality prototype. Inconsistent characters were described 
using six traits and behaviors that were related to introversion/extraversion and three related to 
the converse, conflicting personality type. Mixed characters were described using six traits and 
behaviors that fell within the prototype of extraversion/introversion and three that characterized 
the non-conflicting prototype (good Samaritan).  
In session 1, participants were given the seven character descriptions, along with photos 
and names, and were asked to form personality impressions about each person. They were then 
asked to write down as much about the characters as they could remember. Two days later, 
participants were given the photos of the characters and again asked recall information about the 
characters. Cantor and Mischel (1979) found that more information was correctly recalled about 
the pure characters, followed by the mixed, and then the inconsistent characters. Personality 
impressions were also the “richest” in content for pure characters. Thus the more prototypical or 
“pure” character are the more fully and correctly they are remembered. This logic forms the basis 
for Study 2 of this dissertation.  
 The theme of social prototypicality also appears in the stereotyping literature, in which 
researchers are often interested in how the degree of stereotypicality (i.e., prototypicality) of a 
target affects subsequent judgments and treatment. For example, an emerging literature considers 
phenotype prototypicality, the degree to which physical appearance is perceived to be 
prototypical of a category. Maddox and Gray (2002) asked Black and White participants to 
report their knowledge of stereotypes associated with light- and dark-skinned Blacks and found 
that participants described dark-skinned targets using more stereotypic attributes than they did 
for light-skinned targets. Dark skin is more prototypical of “Blacks” and thus stereotypes were 
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more readily assigned to dark versus light skinned targets. In addition, Wilkins, Kaiser, and 
Rieck (2010) asked participants to view photos of African American faces that were either rated 
as high or low in phenotypic prototypicality. They then saw a list of attributes and were asked 
rank the attributes in terms of importance for that person’s identity. Within this list was the 
attribute, “African-American.” Participants who viewed a face that was high in phenotypic 
prototypicality ranked the African-American attribute as more important to the target’s identity 
than those who viewed a face low in phenotypic prototypicality. Thus the more prototypical an 
individual “looks” of the group, the more likely he or she is to be judged using stereotypical or 
prototypical attributes, and the more likely he or she is to be judged as closely aligned with that 
identity. 
 Not only does prototypicality affect perceiver judgments in the lab, but it has been shown 
to affect behavior in the “real world.” For example, Blair, Judd, and Chapleau (2004) found that 
controlling for criminal histories, defendants who possessed the most stereotypically Black facial 
features (e.g., dark skin, large lips, broad nose) served up to 8 months longer in prison than those 
who possessed the least stereotypically Black features. Likewise, Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-
Vaughns, and Johnson (2005) found that the more “stereotypically Black” a defendant was 
perceived to be based on appearance, the more likely that person was to be sentenced to death. 
The more prototypical features individuals possess the more likely they are to be judged and 
treated in accordance with stereotypes of that group.  
There is also an extensive literature on prototypicality in social groups that highlights the 
experience of feeling non-prototypical.  For example, prototypicality or centrality within a group 
has been shown to be an important factor in inter- and intra- group relations research. Self-
categorization theory (Oakes, 1987; Oakes, Turner, & Haslam, 1991; Turner, 1985) hypothesizes 
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that categorizing the self as part of a group is a function of accessibility of the category and “fit” 
with the prototypical norms and attributes of that group. Prototypicality is also related to self-
stereotyping processes—or the extent to which one associates the self with group stereotypes 
(Hardie & McMurray, 1992; Simon & Hamilton, 1994). In fact, Spears, Doosje, and Ellemers 
(1997) define self-stereotyping as perceiving the self as a prototypical group member. When one 
self-stereotypes, there is a match in attributes between the self and the group. According to 
Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell (1987), self-stereotyping is the process “whereby 
people come to perceive themselves more as the interchangeable exemplars of a social category 
than as unique personalities defined by their individual differences from others” (p. 50).  
To manipulate experienced prototypicality in these studies, often researchers simply tell 
participants, “you are [not] prototypical of group X” (e.g., Jetten, Branscombe, & Spears, 2002). 
When participants are led to believe they are peripheral member rather than prototypical, they 
report lower levels of collective self-esteem and group identity. Other studies simply manipulate 
salience of a category membership. For example Hogg and Turner (1987) manipulated salience 
of gender for male and female participants by setting up a discussion group in which males and 
females disagreed with one another (high gender salience) or in which members of the same 
gender disagreed with one another (low gender salience). They found that when gender was 
salient, participants’ self-descriptions contained more stereotypical gender-consistent attributes 
than was the case when gender was not salient. In this sense participants self-stereotyped or 
thought of themselves as prototypical men or women simply when an important social category 
was made salient.  
In short, an individual is prototypical to the extent that he or she is representative of, and 
possesses attributes consistent with, the “core” of a category. And prototypicality varies as a 
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function of how many attributes or features an individual shares with a category. The current 
research builds on these conceptualizations and manipulations of prototypicality.  
Overview  
Studies 1 and 2 involve manipulating the key feature deemed responsible for invisibility 
effects: Lack of prototypicality. Invisibility of Black women should be highest when Black 
women are explicitly depicted as non-prototypical of their race and/or gender groups. 
Additionally, invisibility should be reduced when Black women appear more prototypical of the 
group “women” and/or “Black.” In these studies, invisibility is measured via the face recognition 
task used in Sesko and Biernat (2010). The extent to which recognition is lower for Black female 
than White female, Black male, and White male faces indicates degree of invisibility.  
As suggested earlier, a stimulus is prototypical to the extent that it possesses attributes 
consistent with the “core” of a category. And prototypicality varies as a function of how many 
attributes a stimulus shares with a category. Thus to the manipulate prototypicality of Black 
women, Study 1 varies the extent to which Black women are numerically representative of the 
group “women,” and Study 2 manipulates the extent to which Black women share attributes with 
White women and/or Black men.   
Study 1 attempted to make Black women appear more prototypical of the group 
“women” by exposing participants to a photo array (described simply as a “group of women”) in 
which Black and White women were equally represented, or in which there was low 
representation of Black women (only 10 out of 80 photos in the array). Participants then 
completed a separate photo recognition task—the same task used in Study 1 of Sesko and 
Biernat (2010). I hypothesize that invisibility of Black women, or lack of recognition of their 
faces, will be reduced when Black women are represented equally with White women, compared 
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to when Black women are in the minority. Indeed, Fryberg and Townsend (2008)’s conception of 
absolute invisibility refers to low numerical social representation (in fact no representation) of 
group members in a given context. Thus by increasing Black women’s representation as group 
members, it should in turn increase perceptions of them as “typical” group members along with 
White women.  
 In Study 2, to manipulate prototypicality of Black women as “women” and/or “Black,” 
participants were exposed to an array of traits and behaviors depicting high overlap (75% shared 
attributes) or low overlap (25% shared attributes) between Black women and White women, or 
between Black women and Black men, or between Black women and both White women and 
Black men. They then completed the photo recognition task designed to measure invisibility. I 
hypothesize that invisibility of Black women will be reduced when Black women share many 
attributes with White women and/or Black men compared to when shared attributes are low. By 
increasing how many attributes Black women share with their White female and Black male 
counterparts, perceptions of them as prototypical group members should increase and invisibility 
should decrease.  
Studies 1 and 2 were designed to manipulate prototypicality in efforts to reduce 
invisibility. But as will become clear in the Results sections below, instead they produced 
findings in direct opposition to hypotheses. Invisibility was reduced when Black women were 
represented in low numbers relative to White women or as sharing low numbers of traits with 
White and/or Black men. Studies 3 and 4 test alternative hypotheses to better understand what 
processes may be underlying these puzzling, albeit interesting, findings. Study 3 addresses the 
possibility that the photos of women in Study 1 were particularity powerful looking and thus 
increased individuation of Black women when they were represented in low numbers (e.g., 
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Fiske, 1993). Study 4 tests the hypothesis that Studies 1 and 2 did not effectively manipulate 
perceived prototypicality but rather primed a focus on how Black women are different or unique 
compared to White women and Black men in the low numerical status and trait overlap 
conditions. Study 4 addresses how a difference focus when making judgments can lead to a 
reduction of reliance on category-based information and an increased use of individuating 
information, thus increasing visibility (e.g., Corcoran, Hundhammer, & Mussweiler, 2009).   
Study 1  
Method 
 Participants and design. Participants were 91 White undergraduates enrolled in an 
Introductory Psychology course who received course credit for their time (53 females; age M = 
18.91, SD = 1.16). Participants were run alone or in groups up to five; each was seated at an 
individual computer. Participants were exposed to a manipulation phase, and then to the task 
designed to measure invisibility: Exposure to faces of Black and White women and men, 
followed by a recognition memory test. The design produced a 2 (numerical status of Black 
women, low versus high) × 2 (target race in the face recognition task: Black, White) × 2 (target 
gender in the face recognition task: female, male) mixed factorial, with numerical status as the 
only between-subjects factor. Participant gender was also examined a potential moderator but as 
it produced no meaningful effects it will not be discussed further in any of the studies.  
 Materials. Photos of Black and White women to be used in the manipulation of 
numerical representation were selected from various public internet sites. All photos consisted of 
head shots of women facing forward, smiling, with business casual attire (e.g., blouses, suit 
jackets), and a non identifiable background (see Appendix A for examples). A total of 169 (64 
Black women, 105 White women; fewer number of Black women due to limited availability that 
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fit the criteria compared to White women) photos were selected and pretested. Specifically, in 
order to avoid particularly distinctive faces (those that might stand out in crowd or be 
particularly memorable; Brandt, Macrae, Schloerscheidt, & Milne, 2003) and to equate faces on 
attractiveness, a separate sample of 16 participants rated each potential photo on distinctiveness 
(1 = typical to 7 = distinctive) and attractiveness (1 = not all attractive to 7 = very attractive). 
Manipulation slides were constructed by first creating the four slides for the equal numerical 
representation condition. Then to create the low numerical representation condition slides, 
photos of Black women were randomly selected to be taken out of the equal status slides and 
new photos of White women were switched in. This was done twice; position of photos was 
varied. Thus there was one set of four slides for the equal numerical representation, and two sets 
of four slides for the low numerical representation condition. Attractiveness and distinctiveness 
were roughly equated for Black and White women both within slides (ps < .05) and between 
slides (ps < .1). Means per slide for attractiveness of Black women ranged from 3.02 (SD = 1.17) 
to 3.56 (SD = .80); White women from 3.06 (SD = .89) to 3.61 (SD = .83). Means per slide for 
distinctiveness of Black women ranged from 3.38 (SD = 87) to 3.87 (SD = .99); White women 
from 3.04 (SD = .83) to 3.91 (SD = .97).  
 For the measurement of invisibility—the photo recognition task—I used the same photos 
and procedures that were used in Sesko and Biernat (2010) Study 1. Specifically, fifty-six photos 
(14 of each gender/race category) were selected from a bank of headshots created by Nosek and 
Banaji (2001). Each photo depicted a close up head shot of a person looking straight ahead 
smiling with a blue background. Again to avoid particularly distinctive faces and to equate faces 
on attractiveness, another separate sample of 10 participants rated each potential photo on 
distinctiveness (1 = typical to 7 = distinctive) and attractiveness (1 = not all attractive to 7 = very 
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attractive). Those selected for this study were judged roughly average on both dimensions (both 
Ms = 3.68), and Target Race × Target Gender repeated measures ANOVAs showed that 
distinctiveness and attractiveness did not differ across the race and gender categories (all Fs ns).  
 Procedure. Participants were told we were interested in how people learn information 
about others and groups and they then were placed through procedures using MediaLab 
programming (Jarvis, 2008).  For the manipulation phase of the experiment, in which I varied the 
numerical representation of Black women in the group “women,” participants were told they 
would be viewing an array of photos of “a group of women.” Their job was simply to view the 
photos. Each of  4 slides of 20 women each were presented for 30 seconds each. The order of the 
slide presentation was random for each participant, and different arrays of 20 photos were 
created within each condition. In the high numerical representation condition, Black women and 
White women were represented equally in a collage-type arrangement on each slide (10:10), for 
a total of 40 Black and 40 White women. In the low numerical representation condition, only two 
or three Black women were on each slide and the remaining seventeen or eighteen women per 
slide were White women, for a total of 10 Black and 70 White women.  
After viewing the photos, participants were told they would move on to an unrelated task 
designed to assess their memory for faces. In phase 1 of this memory task, participants viewed 
32 photos (eight of each gender/race group); each presented for 2 seconds, followed by a red X 
in the center of the screen. Photos were presented in one of three random orders for each 
participant. After completing phase 1, participants completed a filler task in which they were 
asked to list as many cities as they could think of in 3 min. In phase 2, participants were shown 
the same 32 photos they had seen before along with 24 new foils (six of each gender/race group). 
Participants were asked to indicate if the photo was “new” or “old” (Shepard, 1967). Three 
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different fixed order conditions were created, each involving a randomized order of photos and 
mixing of photos between the first and second (foil) phases. After completing the task 
participants were orally debriefed and thanked for their time.  
Results 
 Participants had a 78.52% accuracy rate overall (M errors = 12.03 out of 56 
identifications, SD = 6.11). I first computed hits and false alarms for each category of targets 
(Black and White women and men), then used signal detection analysis to calculate a sensitively 
index or d' (zhits – zfalse alarms) which computes the extent to which participants distinguish between 
new and old faces (higher values = more sensitive).
 1
 A signal detection analysis also provides a 
bias index, β, which captures the willingness of a respondent to say that a target photo was 
present in the original set (higher values means higher standards to make the judgment). 
However, Sesko & Biernat (2010) did not predict or find race and gender effects on bias—the 
invisibility hypothesis does not seem relevant to the question of standards for recognition. Thus, 
here I also focus on d' as the main unit of analysis. I hypothesized that participants would be least 
sensitive—showing lower d'—in response to photos of Black women compared to the other three 
groups. Further, I hypothesized that this would be particularly true when Black women were 
represented as low in numerical status relative to White women. When Black women were 
represented as equal in numerical status to White women, sensitivity in recognition of Black 
female faces should increase.  
Sensitivity index. The sensitivity index, d', was submitted to a Numerical Representation  
× Target Race × Target Gender repeated measures ANOVA, with the between-subjects factor of 
Numerical Representation. There was a significant effect of Target Race, F(1, 89) = 5.40, p = 
.022, such participants were more sensitive in correctly recognizing White targets (M = 1.84, SD 
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= .92) compare to Black targets (M = 1.65, SD = .93). In addition the 3-way interaction was 
significant, F(1, 89) = 5.16, p = .026. However, as can be seen in Figure 1, the pattern of results 
in this 3-way interaction was in a direction opposite to my predictions, such that the Target Race 
× Target Gender interaction was significant in the equal numerical representation condition, F(1, 
29) = 5.38, p  = .028, but not in the low numerical status condition, F(1, 60) = .357, p = .553.  
Specifically, replicating the invisibility effect (Sesko & Biernat, 2010), participants who viewed 
equal numbers of Black and White women in an initial photo array were worse at recognizing 
Black women (M = 1.34, SD = 1.11) compared to White women (M = 1.88, SD = 1.01), Black 
men (M = 1.75, SD = 1.23), and White men (M  = 1.70, SD = 1.05) in a separate photo 
recognition task (all ps < .05), while sensitivity was equal for all other groups (all ps > .30). 
However, when participants viewed low numbers of Black women compared to White women, 
this effect was attenuated such that there were no differences in sensitivity of recognition 
between Black women (M  = 1.84, SD = .77), White women (M  = 1.93, SD = .91), Black men 
(M  = 1.67, SD = .79), and White men (M  = 1.87, SD = .83; all ps > .17).  The 3-way interaction 
was also driven by the fact that sensitivity was higher for Black female faces in the condition 
where Black women were represented as low rather than equal in numerical status to White 
women F(1, 89) = 6.29, p = .014. Recognition was equal across numerical representation 
conditions for White women, Black men, and White men, all ps > .40. 
For comparability with Sesko and Biernat (2010), a three versus one planned comparison 
analysis was performed (comparing d' for Black women with d' for the average of the 3 other 
groups), using the between-subjects factor of Numerical Representation. The Numerical 
Representation × Target (Black women/other) interaction was significant, F(1, 89) = 6.03, p = 
.016. The 3 vs. 1 contrast was larger in the equal representation condition (Ms = 1.34 for BW; 
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1.78 for other 3 groups), than in the low representation condition (Ms = 1.84 for BW; 1.80 for 
other 3 groups).
2
 
Summary. I predicted that participants’ recognition for Black women would be increased 
when they were represented equally in a photo array with White women. Instead participants’ 
recognition for Black women was best when they were represented in low numbers relative to 
White women; indeed, the low representation condition eliminated the invisibility effect. I will 
reserve discussion of this unexpected finding until after presentation of Study 2, which was 
designed as a conceptual replication of Study 1.  
Study 2 
 Study 1 attempted to reduce the invisibility of Black women by increasing their 
numerical representation in the group “women.” I expected that greater presence in the group 
should make Black women more prototypical of the category “women.” However, the pattern of 
results was in direction opposition to this prediction, such that recognition was worse for Black 
women when they were represented in equal numbers with White women in a photo array and 
this effect was attenuated when Black women were represented in low numbers. Thus invisibility 
was reduced in the low instead of equal numerical representation condition. It is possible that my 
manipulation of prototypicality was at fault: Changing the numerical representation of Black 
women in the group women may not have affected their perceived prototypicality. Thus in Study 
2, I relied on a trait-based manipulation of prototypicality that is more consistent with prior 
paradigms (e.g., Cantor & Mischel, 1977, 1979).  
The goal of Study 2 was also to increase visibility of Black women by increasing their 
prototypicality. In this case, however, prototypicality was manipulated by varying the degree to 
which Black women’s traits and behaviors overlapped with those of White women, Black men, 
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or both White women and Black men. I hypothesized that by increasing Black women’s overlap 
with White women and/or Black men, the tendency for Black women to be “invisible” would 
decrease. Specifically, participants should be least sensitive in correctly recognizing Black 
women, relative to White women, Black men, and White men, when shared attributes are low. 
However, when Black women have high overlap with the traits and behaviors of White women, 
and/or Black men, recognition for Black women’s faces should increase.  
Method 
Participants and design. Participants were 102 White undergraduates enrolled in an 
Introductory Psychology course who received course credit for their time (75 females; age M = 
19.23, SD = 1.40). Participants were run alone or in groups up to five; each was seated at an 
individual computer. Participants viewed a manipulation phase and then were exposed to faces 
and later completed a recognition memory test. The study design was a 2 (trait overlap between 
Black women and other group: low or high) × 3 (comparison group: White women, Black men, 
both), × 2 (target race: Black, White) × 2 (target gender: female, male) × mixed design with two 
between-subjects factors, trait overlap and comparison group. The comparison group factor 
produced no effects. That is, whether Black women were compared to White women, Black men, 
or both did not matter. For ease of presentation, I collapsed across this variable and focus on the 
between-subjects factor of trait overlap.  
Materials. Trait overlap conditions were created by presenting participants with a series 
of 4 slides that conveyed information about high (75%) or low (25%) overlap in the traits and 
behaviors of Black women compared to White women, Black men, or both Each slide had an 
array of 20 traits or 20 behaviors listed in a table (see Appendix B for examples). The labels for 
the traits and behaviors were content free and were simply listed as “Trait 1” to “Trait 40” and 
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“Behavior 1” to “Behavior 40.” Within the table (depending on comparison condition) was a 
column for Black women and White women, Black women and Black men, or Black women, 
White women, and Black men. The order of which column came first was varied. In other words, 
Black women were not always listed in the first column. To indicate which traits and behaviors 
were characteristic of each group an X was placed in the cell corresponding to that trait/behavior 
and the group of interest. This was presented in one of three random fixed order conditions. Thus 
in the 25% overlap condition Black women shared an “X” with their comparison group on a 
random assortment of 20 traits/behaviors. In the 75% overlap condition, Black women shared an 
“X” with their comparison group on a random assortment of 60 traits/behaviors. As each slide 
progressed, the overlapped trait/behaviors were highlighted for 3 seconds.  
To measure invisibility of Black women, the same photo recognition task used in Study 1 
was also used in Study 2.   
Procedures. Participants were told we were interested in studying how people learn 
information about others and groups. Next, participants were told the following:   
In phase 1, you will be presented with some new data looking at the traits and behaviors 
of different groups. We are particularly interested in the numerical overlap of attributes of 
certain groups but not necessarily the content, thus you will not see the specifics of the 
traits and behaviors. . . . Next to each trait for each group will be either a blank space or 
an X. The X indicates this group was found to possess this trait or behavior. We simply 
want you to take some time to get acquainted with the data. . .  
In order to manipulate the believability and importance of the trait information, participants were 
led to believe that the information they were about to see was “new data.” Further experimenter 
instructions were constructed to increase participants’ attention to the numerical overlap of traits 
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and behaviors and also to increase believability by clearly explaining why they were just seeing 
traits and behaviors without content (i.e., “Trait 1,” Trait 2”). 
 Participants were paced through procedures on computers using MediaLab (Jarvis, 2008). 
In phase 1, or the manipulation phase, participants viewed the four trait and behavior array 
slides. Each slide was presented for a total of 10 seconds—7 seconds, followed by 3 seconds 
where the overlap between traits and behaviors of the groups presented were highlighted (see 
Appendix B). In phase 2 they completed the same face recognition task as in Study 1. 
Participants were then orally debriefed and thanked for their time.  
Results 
Participants had an 81.11% accuracy rate overall (M errors = 11.14 out of 56 
identifications, SD = 4.18). As in Study 1, I first computed hits and false alarms, then calculated 
a sensitively index or d' (zhits – zfalse alarms) for each of the four target groups (Black and White 
women and men).
3
 I hypothesized that participants would be least sensitive—reflected in lower 
d'—in response to photos of Black women compared to the other three groups. Further, I 
hypothesized that participants should be least sensitive in correctly recognizing Black women in 
the low trait overlap condition, as this reflects low prototypicality of Black women. However, in 
the high overlap condition, I expected that participants’ recognition of Black women would 
increase.  
Sensitivity index. The sensitivity index, d', was submitted to a Trait Overlap × Target 
Race × Target Gender, repeated measures ANOVA, with the between-subjects factor of Trait 
Overlap. The main effects of Target Race, F(1, 100) = 11.65, p = .001, and Target Gender, F(1, 
100) = 6.51, p = .012, were significant. Participants were more sensitive in correctly recognizing 
White (M = 1.98, SD = .80) compared to Black targets (M = 1.75, SD = .76), and more sensitive 
                                                                                                                                                      28 
 
in correctly recognizing female (M = 1.95, SD = .79) compared to male targets (M = 1.77, SD = 
.77). In addition the 3-way interaction was significant, F(1, 100) = 4.87, p = .03, but as depicted 
in Figure 2, the nature of the 3-way interaction was again opposite of my predictions: The Target 
Race × Target Gender interaction was significant in the high trait overlap condition, F(1, 48) = 
4.97, p  = .031, but not in the low trait overlap condition, F(1, 52) = .52, p = .474. Participants 
who viewed high overlap between the traits and behaviors of Black women and others were 
worse at recognizing Black women (M = 1.66, SD = .79) compared to White women (M = 2.13, 
SD = .82) in a separate photo recognition task, t(48) = 3.49, p = .001, though there were no 
significant differences in recognition between Black women and Black men (M = 1.80, SD = .81) 
or White men (M = 1.82, SD = .76; ps > .25). However, when participants viewed low overlap in 
the traits and behaviors of Black women compared to other groups, they were equally good at 
recognizing Black women (M = 1.93, SD = .75) as White women (M = 2.09, SD = .80), t(52) = 
1.28, p = .21, and White men (M = 2.09, SD = .80), t(52) = .34, p = .74. Recognition for Black 
women in this condition was better than it was for Black men (M = 1.59, SD = .64), t(52) = 2.70, 
p = .009.
4
  
Also driving the 3-way interaction, participants were marginally more sensitive in 
recognizing Black women in the low trait overlap condition than the high trait overlap condition, 
F(1, 100) = 2.89, p = .092. However there were no differences in recognition by the trait overlap 
conditions for the other three groups (all ps > .17). 
Again for comparability with Sesko and Biernat (2010), a three versus one planned 
comparison analysis was preformed with the between-subjects factor of Trait Overlap. There was 
a Trait Overlap × Target interaction, F(1, 100) = 4.38, p = .039. The 3 vs. 1 contrast was larger in 
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the high trait overlap condition (Ms = 1.66 for BW; 1.91 for the other three groups), than the low 
trait overlap condition (Ms = 1.95 for BW; 1.85 for the other three groups).
5
   
Discussion of Studies 1 and 2 
 Studies 1 and 2 were designed to manipulate the prototypicality of Black women, with 
the expectation that invisibility of Black women would be high when they were depicted as low 
in prototypicality, but lessened when they were depicted as similar to White women and Black 
men. Instead, I found the opposite patterns. Recognition of Black women was worse in Study 1 
when Black women were represented as numerically equal to White women, compared to when 
they were depicted in low numbers. And in Study 2, participants who were initially exposed to 
an array of traits and behaviors depicting high overlap (75%) between Black women and White 
women and/or Black men, were worse at recognizing Black women in a separate photo 
recognition task compared to participants exposed to a low overlap (25% shared attributes).  
These findings are at odds with a prototypicality account, but they cannot be ignored given the 
two very different methods of Study 1 and Study 2 but comparable results. The surprising 
findings raise at least two possibilities: 1) I may not have manipulated prototypicality but instead 
manipulated something else, and 2) the prototypicality account may be incorrect. The next two 
studies directly address point 1, and indirectly address point 2, by further investigating what 
psychological process my manipulations may have induced.  
Power/Social Status and Invisibility 
  An alternative explanation for the effects reported in Studies 1 and 2 relates to power. In 
Study 1 (albeit not in Study 2) the women depicted in the manipulation phase looked particularly 
“powerful.” They were all wearing business attire and appeared to be middle to upper-middle 
class. There is evidence to suggest that power is related to paying attention to individuating 
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information, and taken together with the numerical status findings of Study 1, may provide a 
possible explanation for the obtained results.  
Fiske (1993) argues that attention to others is directed up the social hierarchy. Powerful 
people—those who hold control over the outcomes of others—are less likely to pay attention to 
individuating characteristics and attributes of subordinates and more likely to rely on category 
based judgments (Goodwin & Fiske, 1996; Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000). In one 
demonstration, Goodwin et al. (2000) manipulated perceiver control (high power) or dependency 
(low power) relative to internship applicants. They found that powerful perceivers increased 
attention to stereotypic information about the applicants and decreased attention to counter-
stereotypic information compared to low power perceivers. Thus powerful perceivers were less 
likely to use individuating information to form impressions of applicants than were perceivers 
who were low in power relative to the applicant.  
 This presumably occurs because power is not contingent on knowing individuating 
information about subordinates (Fiske, 1993; c.f., Overbeck & Park, 2001, and Vescio, Snyder, 
& Butz, 2003; also see Vescio, Gervais, Heiphetz, & Bloodhart, 2009, for a review), and relying 
on stereotypes may help to uphold and legitimize power positions (Fiske, 1993; Goodwin et al., 
2000; Jost & Banaji, 1994). However, individuals with low power tend to pay attention to 
individuating characteristics of the powerful because it is beneficial to form an accurate 
impression of individuals who have control over their outcomes. In this sense, the lack of 
attention or lack of individuation that characterizes invisibility may be a consequence of the 
particularly low power of Black women due to their dual subordinate identity membership. 
These findings suggest that low power can be a direct antecedent to power holders’ perception of 
others as invisible, and to the experience of invisibility by low status members.  
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It is also likely that low power in a group affects and/or is affected by non-prototypicality. 
Indeed, power holders or leaders are typically also prototypical of the group (Hogg, 2001). And 
non-prototypical leaders are less likely to exert influence and are less likely to be perceived as 
having important leadership qualities (e.g., charisma) than their more prototypical counterparts 
(Hogg, 2001; Platow, van Knippenberg, Haslam, van Kippenberg, & Spears, 2006). Thus, low 
power may be correlated with low prototypicality, which may affect both perceptions and 
experiences of invisibility. In Study 1, both Black and White women were depicted as having 
relatively high power in the manipulation phase, which may have increased the visibility of both 
groups. However, in one condition Black women were also represented in low numbers relative 
to White women, and in fact some research suggests that low numerical status increases salience 
or attention (e.g, Kanter, 1977). I briefly review some of this research below to highlight how 
coupled with high power, low numerical status may have increased the visibility of Black 
women.  
Numerical minority status and invisibility 
Fryberg and Townsend’s (2008) conception of absolute invisibility refers to low 
numerical social representation (in fact no representation) of group members in a given context. 
Likewise, given their low social status within society, ethnic minorities (who are in fact 
numerically less present in the population) and women are often represented as solos or low in 
numbers relative to higher social status members (e.g., White men; Kanter, 1977; Niemann & 
Dovidio, 1998; Lord & Saenz, 1985; Sekaquaptewa & Thompson, 2002).  
Interestingly, however, much theory and research on low numerical status suggests that 
this may actually increase visibility (e.g., Kanter, 1977). Specifically, as group size decreases, 
the salience of that group is theorized to increase (Mullen, 1991, 1989; Taylor et al, 1978; c.f. 
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Oakes, 1987). Work on solo status has likewise suggests that solos/tokens draw attention, thus 
increasing visibility (Kanter, 1977; Taylor & Fiske, 1978; Taylor et. al, 1978). Conversely, as 
group size increases, the salience of the group decreases (Mullen, 1991).  
In other words, low numbers of high powered Black women in Study 1 could have 
produced increased individuation compared to when they were represented in high numbers 
along with high powered White women. The combination of high power and low numerical 
status may have led to the observed increased visibility of Black women in the “low numerical 
representation” condition relative to when Black women were represented in equal numbers with 
White women. Study 3 tests this assumption by adding a power/status manipulation to the Study 
1 paradigm.  
Study 3 
Study 3 is a replication of Study 1, with an added manipulation of perceived power of the 
women depicted in the initial photo arrays. Participants were told that the photos of women 
presented in the manipulation phase were either “secretaries” or “upper level managers” at 
various companies. I also included another numerical representation condition in which White 
women were represented as low in numerical status relative to Black women (10 photos out of 
80 in the array). Thus, there were 3 numerical status conditions (low Black women, low White 
women, and equal Black and White women) crossed with the secretary/manager power 
manipulation.  
Following Fryberg and Townsend’s (2008) conceptualization of invisibility, I 
hypothesized that when Black women are represented in low numerical status and low power 
they will be the least likely to be correctly recognized in a separate photo recognition relative to 
White women, Black men, and White men. But based on Study 1, when Black women are 
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represented as high in power but low in numerical status, recognition should increase compared 
to when they are represented in equal numbers with equivalently high powered White women.  It 
is unclear how and if representing White women as low in power and numerical status will have 
an effect on recognition of Black women or of White women.  
Method 
Participants and design. Participants were 165 White undergraduates enrolled in an 
Introductory Psychology course who received course credit for their time (74 females; Age, M = 
19.22, SD = 1.85)
6
. Participants were run alone or in groups up to five; each was seated at an 
individual computer. Participants viewed a manipulation phase and then were exposed to faces 
and later completed a recognition memory test. The task produced a 3 (numerical representation: 
low Black women, low White women, equal) × 2 (power: high, low) × 2 (target race: Black, 
White) × 2 (target gender: female, male) mixed design, with the between-subjects factors of 
numerical representation and power.  
Procedure. Procedures were identical to Study 1, except participants were told that the 
photos of women in the manipulation phase represented either secretaries from various 
companies or that the women held upper level management positions in various companies. 
Specifically, before viewing the 4 slides of women, participants read on the computer screen the 
following (emphasis in original; low power condition in brackets): 
INSTRUCTIONS: We are interested in studying how people learn information about 
others and groups. In this first phase you will see photos of individuals belonging to a 
particular group, in this case to the group WOMEN. All of these women hold upper level 
management jobs [are secretaries] from various companies. Your job will be simply to 
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spend some time viewing these photos of females who hold UPPER LEVEL 
MANAGEMENT [SECRETARIAL] positions.  
At the end of the recognition task, participants completed a manipulation check in which they 
were asked to indicate how powerful they viewed the women to be in the first task on a scale 
from 1—not at all powerful to 7—very powerful.
7
   
Results 
 The manipulation check showed that while indeed participants rated women described as 
upper level management as more powerful (M = 4.48, SD = 1.16) than women described as 
secretaries (M = 4.16, SD = .87), this difference was not significant, F(1, 58) = 1.45, p = .234. 
This issue will be returned to in the Discussion.  
Participants had a 76.95% accuracy rate overall (M errors = 12.91 out of 56 
identifications, SD = 5.36). I first computed hits and false alarms, then calculate the sensitivity 
index or d' (zhits – zfalse alarms) for Black and White women and men.
8
 I hypothesized that when 
Black women were represented in low numerical status and low power they would be the least 
likely to be correctly recognized in a separate photo recognition task—evident in lower d'—
relative to White women, Black men, and White men. But when Black women were represented 
as high in power but low in numerical status, recognition should increase compared to when they 
were represented in equal numbers with White women and high in power. I had no clear 
predictions regarding the effects of representing White women as low in power and numerical 
status.  
Sensitivity index. The sensitivity index, d', was submitted to a Numerical Representation 
× Power  × Target Race × Target Gender repeated measures ANOVA. The only significant effect 
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was a main effect of Target Race, F(1, 159) = 7.71, p = .006, such that White targets (M  = 1.88, 
SD = .81) were recognized better than Black targets (M  = 1.72, SD = .82).
9
 
Discussion 
There was no evidence that power in combination with numerical status explains the 
effects of Study 1. In fact there were no significant effects other than Target Race for d'. The 
complete lack of effects on d' was puzzling, as I did not replicate the findings of Study 1 in the 
high power condition. It is possible that the current power manipulation was simply not 
adequate. In fact the power manipulation check indicated this may have been the case. However, 
also interesting was the frequency of ratings on this scale. Most ratings of power clustered 
around 4 (N = 29) or 5 (N = 19) and no one rated the photos as a 7 on the powerful scale. Thus 
participants viewed the women to hold “average” power but not to be particularly powerful. This 
suggests that in fact power may not have driven the obtained effects in Study 1 as in general (at 
least in this study) participants were not inclined to see the women as powerful. It is therefore 
possible that this manipulation simple created noise rather than manipulated power or explained 
the effects of Study 1. Some evidence of noise is apparent in a close reading of the footnotes that 
accompany this Results section – there were more problematic data. A larger number of 
participants than expected had negative d's, and were excluded from the analyses. However, 
results analyzed with and without these participants were comparable. A negative d' indicates 
that participants were insensitive to the signal or in this case the faces, in a way that tends to 
result in incorrect responses (Macmillan & Creelman, 1991). Negative d' could also suggest that 
a participants were deliberately giving the incorrect answer or that there was a misunderstanding 
about which answer corresponds to the correct answer. So in this case, participants could have 
confused the responses “new” and “old.” While it is unclear exactly what produced these 
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negative d's, it does indicate participants’ attention to the faces and the procedures were possibly 
diverted. Likewise, drawing attention to occupational status of the targets may also have 
distracted attention from race, resulting in a failure to replicate the invisibility effect in the equal 
representation condition. Of course, null effects are difficult to interpret, but the bottom line is 
that the consideration of power did not shed any additional light on the unexpected findings 
produced in Studies 1 and 2.  
Much work suggests that power does affect perceptions of individuation, and the current 
study certainly does not suggest otherwise. However, what it does suggest is that power is not a 
good alternative explanation for puzzling, albeit interesting findings of Study 1 (or of Study 2). 
Study 4 tests a different alternative hypothesis—namely that drawing attention to the uniqueness 
or differences of Black women compared to White women and Black men increased their 
individuation.  
Study 4 
 The low numerical representation condition of Study 1 and the low trait overlap condition 
of Study 2 both could be conceptualized as manipulating perceived difference or uniqueness of 
Black women relative to their White female and Black male counterparts. In fact, within the 
literature on comparative thinking, research suggests that focusing on differences compared to 
similarities leads to increased individuation and reduced reliance on stereotypes as guides for 
judgment (Corcoran, et al., 2009). Study 4 directly addresses the hypothesis that it was this focus 
on differences that lead to Black women’s increased visibility in these conditions.  
When comparative thinking increases individuation 
When people judge themselves or others they rely on comparisons with accessible 
standards (Festinger, 1954). In his selective accessibility model, Mussweiler (2003) argues that 
                                                                                                                                                      37 
 
comparative thinking occurs in three stages. First a standard is selected, then a comparison 
occurs, and then knowledge from this comparison is used to make a judgment. For example, 
Mussweiler and Strack (2000) asked participants to compare their athletic ability with a high 
athletic standard (the German race car driver Nicki Lauda) or low athletic standard (former U.S. 
President Bill Clinton). They then completed a lexical decision task that included words 
associated with low and high athleticism. Participants who were given the high athletic standard 
were faster to associate the high athletic words with themselves than the low athletic words. But 
when they were given the low athletic standard they were more likely to associate the low 
athletic words with themselves than the high athletic words. In this sense the comparison 
standard rendered self knowledge that was consistent with that standard more accessible.  
In the second stage individuals engage in hypothesis testing in which they assess either 
the similarity or dissimilarity of the target to the standard. As a default individuals typically 
begin by engaging in a holistic similarity testing, briefly using a small number of salient features, 
to assess if the target fits the standard of comparison. If so, the process becomes more fine tuned 
and the perceiver continues to selectively search for standard-consistent information—resulting 
in assimilation to the standard (as was the case in Mussweiler & Strack, 2000). In cases when 
target-standard fit is low, dissimilarity testing occurs and perceivers selectively search for 
standard-inconsistent information and the result is a contrast from the standard.  
Much research suggests that perceivers readily engage in similarity testing as a default 
compared to dissimilarity testing (e.g., Bodenhausen & Macrae 1998; Brewer, 1988; Festinger, 
1954; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Mussweiler, 2003; Mussweiler & Bodenhausen, 2002). One 
reason this occurs is because typically perceivers select standards of comparison that are similar 
to the target (Festinger, 1954). In addition perceivers typically use standards that are highly 
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accessible—such as category information or stereotypes. Stereotyping research suggests that 
stereotypes tend to be highly available standards and are often activated automatically (e.g., 
Devine, 1989) and spontaneously (Bargh, 1999). Likewise, Fiske and Neuberg’s (1990) 
continuum model of impression formation and Brewer’s (1988) dual-process model suggest that 
when encountering an individual they are quickly categorized into relevant social groups (e.g., 
by race or gender). Then a confirmatory categorization occurs in which the fit of the individual 
to the standard is assessed. Typically the fit is assessed as good since category standards are 
salient and activated and thus individual attributes are easily matched with category standards. 
This results in assimilation to stereotype-based knowledge. In cases when fit is not good, 
recategorization (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) occurs or a person is individuated (Brewer, 1988). Or 
as Mussweiler’s (2003) selective accessibility model suggests, judgments are contrasted away 
from the standard.  
There are however, cases in which dissimilarity testing takes precedence. As one 
example, Mussweiler and Bodenhausen (2002) demonstrated that dissimilarity testing is more 
likely to occur if the target and standard belong to different categories. For example, in a series 
of studies they had male participants read about either female or male targets who possessed 
gender stereotypical female traits—for example “tidiness.” They found that when men read 
about other male targets they were more likely to use individuating information to describe 
themselves that was similar to the target attributes—they assimilated to the target standard (e.g., 
described themselves as tidy). However, when they read about female targets they were more 
likely to use gender-consistent category information to describe themselves rather than attributes 
associated with the target—they contrasted away from the target (e.g., described themselves as 
messy). Thus, standard-consistent knowledge was more accessible when the target person was an 
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ingroup male, and standard-inconsistent knowledge was more accessible when the target person 
was outgroup female. Thus comparison of the self to an ingroup member yields assimilation to 
the standard, while comparison to an outgroup results in contrast. Also Mussweiler (2003) argues 
other features such as extremity or motivation can result in dissimilarity testing over similarity 
testing. Specifically, individuals are often unlikely to compare how they are similar to extreme 
standards (e.g., compare their athleticism to Michael Jordan). Likewise, individuals may be 
motivated to use dissimilarity testing for a variety of reasons. For example, doing so may be self-
protective if similarity testing involves comparing yourself to a negative standard.  
Demonstrating the assimilation-contrast effect in comparative hypothesis testing, 
Mussweiler and colleagues have used a procedural priming method to focus participants on 
differences versus similarities when making judgments. In the procedural priming task, 
participants view two scenes depicting 19
th
 century town squares, and are asked either to write 
down all the similarities or all the differences between the two scenes. Focusing on differences 
using this procedure has been shown to increase perspective taking (Todd, Hanko, Galinsky, & 
Mussweiler, 2010), and reduce reliance on category-based information for judgments—or 
stereotyping—and thus increase individuation (Corcoran et al., 2009; Mussweiler & Darmisch, 
2008). Most relevant to stereotyping outcomes, Corcoran et al. (2009) used the procedural 
priming of differences v. similarities and then in a supposedly separate part of the experiment, 
led participants to choose a seat in a room that appeared to be occupied by a “skinhead” (a 
bomber jacket and military boots, stereotypical skinhead items, were lying in front of one of the 
chairs in the room). They then measured how close the participants chose to sit next to the other 
participant as their behavioral measure of stereotyping. They found that when participants were 
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primed to focus on differences they sat closer to the “skinhead chair” than when they were 
focused on similarities, suggesting a lesser reliance on stereotypical knowledge. 
Particularly relevant to Study 4 of this dissertation, Corcoran et al. (2009) conducted a 
second study in which they again used the difference/similarity priming method described above, 
and then assigned participants to the role of manager. In this role, participants were given 
information (e.g., resume, comments from coworkers) about an employee who was either female 
or male. Participants were then asked to judge the employee on a set of attributes that included 
both stereotypical female traits (sympathetic, compassionate) and stereotypical male traits 
(technically skilled, logically skilled). They found that when participants were procedurally 
primed to focus on similarities they ascribed more stereotypical female traits to female 
employees and stereotypical male traits to male employees. However, when they were primed to 
focus on differences this pattern of stereotyping did not occur; they were less likely to ascribe 
stereotypical traits to the target employees. Corcoran et al. (2009) argue that a difference focus 
allows perceivers to counteract the consequences of assimilation to group stereotypes and instead 
leads perceivers to use individuating information when making judgments.  
Comparative thinking and invisibility 
I suggest that the low numerical representation condition of Study 1 and the low trait 
overlap condition of Study 2 were in fact priming a focus on how Black women are different 
from their White female and Black male counterparts compared to the equal numerical 
representation and high trait overlap conditions. Specifically, in Study 1 the low representation 
condition could have highlighted how Black women are different than the group women—
simply by showing them in lower numbers relative to White women. In Study 2, the low trait 
overlap condition explicitly indicated that Black women have different traits and behaviors than 
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White women and/or Black men. I suggest that this difference focus in turn increased visibility 
by reducing reliance on category information, much like it did in Corcoran et al. (2009).  
Although increasing perceived prototypicality may still provide a viable method for 
increasing visibility, I would like to suggest that an alternative method is to decrease reliance on 
category information by engaging in dissimilarity testing rather than the default of similarity 
testing. Reducing the need for category information in person perception subsequently eliminates 
or reduces the non-prototypicality problem and thus increases visibility by increasing use of 
individuating information. I return to the issue of prototypicality and how it may fit within the 
framework of similarity-dissimilarity testing in the General Discussion.  
Study 4 tests this assumption by procedurally priming participants to focus on differences 
or similarities using the same 19
th
 century town square task used by Corcoran et al. (2009), and 
then using the same face recognition task reported in Studies 1-3 to measure invisibility. I 
hypothesize that when participants are primed to focus on similarities, the typical invisibility 
effect will occur, with recognition lowest for Black women compared to White women, Black 
men, and White men. However, when participants are primed to focus on differences, this effect 
will be attenuated/reduced.  
Method 
Participants and design. Participants were 94 White undergraduates enrolled in an 
Introductory Psychology course who received course credit for their time (46 females; age M = 
19.44, SD = 1.58).
10
 Participants were run alone or in groups up to five; each was seated at an 
individual computer. Participants were exposed to a prime designed to procedurally induce a 
general focus on differences or similarities, and then to the task designed to measure invisibility: 
Exposure to faces of Black and White women and men, followed by a recognition memory test. 
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The design produced a 2 (focus prime: differences, similarities) × 2 (target race in the face 
recognition task: Black, White) × 2 (target gender in the face recognition task: female, male) 
mixed factorial, with the focus prime as the only between-subjects factor.  
Procedure. Participants were told they would be completing two unrelated studies. 
Following directly from procedures used by Corcoran et al. (2009; also see Mussweiler & 
Darmisch, 2008; Mussweiler, 2001), participants were led to believe that in the first study we 
were pretesting a series of pictures that we would later use in studies on event memory. In 
addition they were told that they would be completing a second study, unrelated to the first, in 
which we were interested in how people learn information about others and groups and that to do 
so they would be completing a memory of faces task.  
 Participants were then placed through procedures using MediaLab programming (Jarvis, 
2008). In the priming phase participants saw two drawings placed side by side of 19
th
 century 
town squares (see Appendix C). These directions and materials were taken directly from 
previous work (Corcoran et al., 2009; Mussweiler & Darmisch, 2008; Mussweiler, 2001) to 
procedurally prime a focus on differences or similarities. Below the photos they read the follow: 
The purpose of this brief study is to pretest a series of pictures that we will later use in 
studies on event memory. Please carefully examine the two pictures on the enclosed 
page. Please try to determine in which respects both pictures are similar [different] and 
write down as many commonalities [differences] as possible. In doing so it is important 
that you closely examine the two pictures and list as many commonalities [differences] as 
possible. Please allow yourself a few minutes to make this comparison. Which 
commonalities [differences] between the two pictures were you able to find?  
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 Participants had a sheet of paper at their desk that they were instructed to use to write down the 
similarities or differences between the drawings. When they completed this task, the computer 
progressed to a screen that indicated study 2 was “loading.” This lasted for 10 seconds. As a 
measure of invisibility, they then completed the same memory for faces task completed in Study 
1 – 3. They were then orally debriefed and thanked for their time.  
Results 
 Participants had a 79.05% accuracy rate overall (M errors = 11.73 out of 56 
identifications, SD = 4.72). I first computed hits and false alarms for each category of targets 
(Black and White women and men), then used signal detection analysis to calculate a sensitively 
index or d' (zhits – zfalse alarms). 
11
 I hypothesized that participants would be least sensitive—
showing lower d '—in response to photos of Black women compared to the other three groups. 
Further, I hypothesized that this would be particularly true when participants were primed with a 
similarity focus. When participants are primed with a difference focus recognition of Black 
female faces should increase.  
Sensitivity index. The sensitivity index, d',  results are depicted in Figure 3. These data 
were submitted to a Focus Prime × Target Race × Target Gender repeated measures ANOVA, 
with the between-subjects factor of Focus Prime. There was a significant effect of Target Race, 
F(1, 92) = 6.35, p = .013, such that recognition was best for White targets (M = 1.88, SD = .65) 
compared to Black targets (M = 1.66, SD = .64). In addition there was a marginal Focus Prime × 
Target Gender interaction, F(1, 92) = 3.47, p < .07, but the 3-way interaction was not significant, 
F < 1.   
Nonetheless, an inspection of the means in Figure 3 does indicate a pattern of Black 
women invisibility in the similar focus condition: Participants were worse at recognizing Black 
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women (M = 1.46, SD = .82) compared to White women (M = 1.82, SD = .94; p = .036), Black 
men (M = 1.75, SD = .93; p = .08), and White men (M = 1.92, SD = .82; p = .013). However, as 
predicted, these differences did not occur in the difference focus condition, all ps > .387 (BW M 
= 1.78, SD = .79; WW M = 1.92, SD = .88; BM M = 1.68, SD = .77; WM M = 1.85, SD = .75). No 
other pairwise comparisons reached significance in either condition.  
In addition, a three versus one planned comparison analysis was performed (comparing 
d’ for Black women compared with d’ for the average of the 3 other groups; see Sesko & 
Biernat, 2010), using the between-subjects factor of Focus Prime. There was an effect of Target, 
F(1, 92) = 4.50, p < .05, and a marginal Focus Prime × Target (Black women/other) interaction, 
F(1, 92) = 3.16, p < .08. As depicted in Figure 4, the 3 vs. 1 contrast was significant in the 
similar focus condition, t(48) = 2.62, p  = .012, (Ms = 1.46 for BW; 1.83 for other 3 groups), but 
not in the difference focus condition, t(44) = .26, p = .796, (Ms = 1.78 for BW; 1.82 for other 3 
groups). Further, participants were more sensitive in recognizing Black women in the difference 
focus condition compared to the similar focus condition (p = .05), but there was no difference in 
recognition by focus prime for the other three groups combined (p = .92), or for any of the other 
groups separately (all ps > .60).
12
 
Discussion 
 While the predicted Focus Prime ×Target Race × Target Gender interaction was not 
significant, the results do suggest that procedurally priming participants to focus on differences 
versus similarities reduces invisibility effects. Replicating past invisibility effects, recognition for 
Black women was worse in comparison to White women, Black men, and White men in the 
similarity focus condition. However, when participants were primed to focus differences, this 
effect was attenuated. Further, recognition was better for Black women in the difference focus 
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condition compared to the similarity focus condition, but this difference in recognition across 
prime condition did not occur for other groups. These data closely mirror the findings from 
Study 1 and 2 and lend support to the hypothesis that presenting Black women in low numerical 
numbers or as having low trait overlap relative to White women and/or Black men may have 
actually manipulated a focus on how Black women are different or unique.   
 Study 4 extends work by Corcoran et al. (2009) on comparative thinking and stereotyping 
and also lends support to the idea that a difference focus can lead to a reduction in use of 
category based information and an increased used of individuating information. Implications for 
future work on invisibility are discussed below.  
General Discussion  
 I began this research by manipulating the key feature deemed responsible for the 
invisibility: non-prototypicality. In Studies 1 and 2 I hypothesized that invisibility of Black 
women would be highest when Black women were explicitly depicted as non-prototypical of 
their race and/or gender groups, but reduced when Black women appeared more prototypical of 
the group “women” and/or “Black.” To manipulate prototypicality, Study 1 varied the numerical 
representation of Black women to be low or high relative to White women and Study 2 varied 
the trait overlap of Black women to be low or high relative to White women and/or Black men. 
Rather than invisibility being reduced under conditions of equal numerical status and high trait 
overlap, the opposite occurred: Low numerical representation of Black women and low trait 
overlap reduced invisibility relative to conditions of high numerical status and high trait overlap 
with White females and/or Black males.  
On their face, these findings seem at odds with a prototypicality account, and two 
counter-intuitive findings using different procedures are difficult to ignore. Studies 3 and 4 were 
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designed to further investigate the psychological processes that may have been instigated by my 
manipulations of low numerical representation and low trait overlap. I considered two alternative 
explanations: Power and attention to differences.  
Power  
 Study 3 was based on the possibility that the women depicted in the manipulation phase 
of Study 1—in which participants viewed photo arrays of well-dressed Black and White 
women—looked particularly powerful. Research suggests that powerful people are more likely 
to be individuated than those with low power (Fiske, 1993). Thus I hypothesized that the 
combination of high power and low numerical status of Black women in this condition may have 
increased individuation and thus increased recognition for Black women’s faces in the test phase. 
To test this possibility, I attempted to lower the perceived power of women, by explicitly 
labeling them “secretaries” in one condition of Study 3. I predicted that the combination of low 
power and low numerical status (low prototypicality) would increase the invisibility of Black 
women. But Study 3 found no support for this power account, and indeed, I failed to replicate the 
Study 1 findings in the “high power” (“managers”) condition. One reason for the lack of effects 
may have been that the manipulation of power was simply not strong enough, but of course this 
still does not explain the lack of replication in the high power condition of Study 3. Perhaps the 
mention of occupational status of the women simply confused participants in some way, but at 
this point I have no clear explanation for the lack of findings in this study. Future work should 
use alternative power manipulations to investigate these ideas further.  
Although Study 3 did not support the alternative power hypothesis, there is quite a bit of 
work that suggests that power may play a role in invisibility (Goodwin & Fiske, 1996; Goodwin, 
Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000; Fiske, 1993). In fact I suggest that because low power 
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individuals are less likely to be individuated than those high in power, low power may itself be a 
direct antecedent of invisibility, and may contribute to negative downstream consequences of 
being invisible.  
As an example, Thomas and González-Prendes (2009) propose that many negative health 
outcomes associated with Black women are due to a high risk of feelings of “powerlessness,” 
which are in part shaped by social status disparities related to sexism and racism. Much like 
Franklin and Boyd-Franklin’s (2000) invisibility syndrome that applies to Black males, they 
propose that feelings of powerlessness “creates barriers that limit, or even deny, the individual’s 
capacity to implement solutions to problems, while simultaneously increasing an internal sense 
of helplessness, low self-efficacy, and physical and emotional distress” (p. 93). Specifically, they 
propose a conceptual model in which a combination of trying to meet the expectation of a 
“strong Black woman,” but experiences of low income, employment status, few positions of 
power, and poverty leads to powerlessness. These feeling of powerlessness lead to feelings of 
anger and stress and as a consequence, negative health outcomes such as obesity, diabetes, and 
hypertension. Thomas and González-Prendes (2009) argue that the invisibility of Black women 
within the literature on the gender and race in the mental health arena may “actually exacerbate 
the sense of powerlessness experienced by these women” (p. 102). It is likely that the sense of 
powerlessness and negative health related outcomes lead to further decreases in power, 
perpetuating invisibility. Future work needs to address what role power may play in invisibility, 
both at the cognitive level that is the basis for the current work, but also at the level of  
downstream consequences for Black women..  
Attention to differences 
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 With power set aside as an explanation for the results of Study 1, Study 4 tested the 
hypothesis that the low numerical representation condition of Study 1 and the low trait overlap 
condition of Study 2 both could be conceptualized as manipulations of the perceived difference 
or uniqueness of Black women relative to their White female and Black male counterparts. 
Specifically, literature on comparative thinking suggests that focusing on differences compared 
to similarities leads to increased individuation and reduced reliance on stereotypes as guides for 
judgment (Corcoran, et al., 2009). Study 4 directly tested the hypothesis that it was this focus on 
differences that lead to Black women’s increased visibility in these conditions by procedurally 
priming participants to be focused on similarities or differences before completing a face 
recognition task.  
Although the 3-way interaction was not significant, the pattern of means, and the more 
focused 3 vs. 1 comparison (Black women versus other groups), supported predictions: Focusing 
on differences in an unrelated task increased recognition or visibility of Black women relative to 
focusing on similarities. These effects mirror the results of Studies 1 and 2 and suggest that 
indeed the manipulations in those studies may not have altered perceived prototypicality, but 
rather affected the extent to which Black women were different or unique compared to their 
White female and Black male counterparts. Being low in numerical representation and low in 
trait overlap triggered greater recognition of Black women’s faces.  
 The findings of Study 4 are particularly compelling because the focus prime was 
completely unrelated to the face recognition task and cleanly manipulated a difference or 
similarity focus. The results were not as strong as predicted; unlike Studies 1 and 2, the overall 
3-way interaction was not significant. But this may have been due to the very nature of the 
prime. The procedures used in Studies 1 and 2 directly manipulated perceived differences or 
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similarities between Black women and White men and/or Black men, whereas Study 4 led 
participants to think about drawing of town squares. In any case, the pattern of generally 
consistent findings across the three studies suggests that the “difference” account is worth 
pursuing. 
 Mussweiler and colleagues have suggested that a difference focus reduces a reliance on 
category based information, thus increasing individuation and visibility (e.g., Corcoran et al., 
2009). Whether this is precisely the mechanism at work in the current studies is unclear. It is 
possible that the increased visibility of Black women in the difference focus condition (and in the 
low numerical or low trait overlap conditions of Studies 1 and 2) is not due to increased 
individuation but rather to participants having recategorized Black women into the subgroup 
“Black women.” For example Fiske and Neuberg (1990) argue when individuals do not fit a 
category well, they are often recategorized into a better fitting category. By drawing participants’ 
attention to how Black women are different than the prototypical categories of “Black” and 
“women,” recategorization as “Black women” may have provided the better fit. In other words, 
inducing participants to notice how Black women do not fit the prototypical categories of Black 
and women could have also induced them to search for a better fitting category—or “Black 
women.” If this was the case, they lost their non-prototypical status (i.e., Black women fit the 
category “Black women” better than “Black” or “women”), and thus visibility increased. While 
more work is needed to understand whether individuation or recategorization occurred in the 
current studies, the results of Study 1, 2, and 4 suggest that invisibility can be reduced by 
manipulations that highlight difference.   
What about prototypicality? 
                                                                                                                                                      50 
 
I began this research arguing that non-prototypicality is a key antecedent of invisibility; 
the initial goal of Studies 1 and 2 was to investigate this assumption. I end the dissertation by 
highlighting the role of difference in reducing invisibility. But does this mean that similarity 
increases it? And to the extent that similarity means prototypicality, what does this mean for the 
prototypicality account? Research suggests that the more similar an individual is to a category 
the more prototypical they are. In this sense similarity = prototypicality (Spears et al., 1997). 
Thus it seems that if Black women are non-prototypical of their race and gender categories, then 
perceivers should readily switch from similarity testing to dissimilarity testing. Their lack of fit 
with the categories of “Black” and “women” should facilitate perceivers’ use of dissimilarity 
over similarity testing. However if correct, this account does not explain prior invisibility effects 
(Sesko & Biernat, 2010) or the effects obtained in Studies 1, 2, and 4. If dissimilarity testing 
results from non-prototypicality, and focusing on differences leads to an increase in recognition 
then why are Black women often invisible? Is the non-prototypicality account incorrect? 
Importantly, I argue the role of difference focus in reducing invisibility is in fact compatible with 
the non-prototypicality account of invisibility.  
Much research suggests that gender, race, and age are quickly encoded and used in 
judgments upon encountering individuals (Allport, 1954; Brewer, 1988; Devine, 1989; Fiske & 
Neuberg, 1990; Talyor, et al., 1978), and thus I assume that Black women are readily compared 
to the category standards of Black and female because these categories are highly accessible and 
used often; but this comparison is hindered because of their non-prototypical status, and a 
downstream consequence is invisibility. There is some research to suggest this is the case. As 
reviewed in the general introduction, Zárate and Smith (1990) found that White participants 
categorized Black targets more slowly than White targets (by race and gender), but especially 
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when the targets were Black women (Study 2). Further, Goff, et al., (2008) found that 
participants were less accurate in categorizing the gender of Black women relative to White 
women and Black men (using facial stimuli in Study 1, and silhouettes of people walking in 
Study 2). In this research, categories were explicitly given to participants. They were asked for 
example if the person in the photo was Black/White, Female/Male (Zárate & Smith, 1990). The 
low accuracy that occurs for Black women targets in these studies are comparable to the memory 
errors found in Sesko and Biernat (2010), where no direct gender and/or race comparison was 
given to participants. Poor recognition of Black women was also evident in the low numerical 
representation, low trait overlap, and similarity focus conditions of Studies 1, 2, and 4 of this 
dissertation. The comparability in findings across studies suggests perceivers do readily engage 
in categorizing Black women within the categories of “Black” and “women.” Further, given poor 
recognition was found in the similarity focus condition of Study 4, but not in the difference focus 
condition, it suggests that perceivers also engage in similarity testing as a default and not 
dissimilarity testing.  
Given these findings I argue that perceivers do readily engage in testing the similarity 
between Black women and their race and gender categories; however, because of their non-
prototypical status this process is often hindered (e.g., poor memory and low accuracy). Further 
while it is the case that fit may be low compared to their prototypical Black male and White 
female counterparts, it is not the case that fit = 0. For example, as previously reviewed, 
descriptive research suggests that while some stereotypes of Black women are in direct 
opposition to the stereotypes of Black men and White women, others are inconsistent (Landrine, 
1985; Niemann et al.,1994; Maddox & Gray, 2002). Also it is clearly the case that Black 
women’s gender is female, and race/ethnicity is Black. Thus, I hypothesize that comparing the 
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similarities of non-prototypical individual to a category is what results in invisibility. By drawing 
perceivers’ attention to differences, it reduces invisibility by decreasing the need for using 
category-based information of which is fit is low for the target.  
However, as argued in the introduction increasing perceived prototypicality or similarity 
of Black women within the categories of Black and women should theoretically still increase 
their visibility. The empirical question that remains is how exactly to do this. It may be the case 
that it will take more than exposure to 4 slides, the technique used in Studies 1 and 2, to increase 
perceived prototypicality, and instead repeated exposure to Black women as prototypical of these 
groups. Rosch (1975) argues that prototypes are formed by repeated social representations of the 
categories. In other words, a robin is not intrinsically more prototypically of a bird than a 
penguin but instead these category features are learned. We hear more about and see more 
representations of robins as birds then penguins. Likewise, Fryberg and Townsend (2008) argue 
invisibility is a function of a repeated lack of social representation of group members. In sum, the 
best way to reduce invisibility long-term may still be to increase perceptions of Black women as 
prototypical of Black and women. However, it may also be the most difficult way.  
In sum, I suggest that instead of increasing prototypicality to reduce invisibility, a more 
direct way to reduce invisibility may be to reduce reliance on category based information when 
making judgments. By focusing on how Black women are different, or maybe better stated—
unique, from White women and Black men it reduces perceivers’ need to use the categories of 
“women” and “Black” when perceiving and making judgments about Black women. In this 
sense, the non-prototypicality of Black women is bypassed when making judgments. Instead, as 
Corcoran et al. (2009) suggests “a difference focus may be the perfect tool in the cognitive 
misers’ toolbox to undo the unwanted behavior and judgmental consequences of stereotype 
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activation” (p. 1010). A difference focus allows perceivers to reduce reliance on category-based 
information and subsequently reduces invisibility.  
Consequences of invisibility  
 The studies presented in this dissertation examine the processes of invisibility at a basic, 
perceptual level of face recognition. Thus the findings are limited in scope and generalizablity to 
the broader question of how invisibility matters. However, I propose that treatment of non-
prototypical group members as invisible (i.e., as interchangeable and indistinguishable) has 
certain downstream consequences for further treatment and experiences—both advantageous and 
disadvantageous—that could be considered in future work in light of the current findings.  
For example, invisibility may mean that one is less likely to be treated as a prototypical 
group member. To the extent that prototypical Blacks are treated badly, this may mean that 
Black women are less likely to experience the “typical” discrimination faced by Black men and 
White women (Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008). But as a clear disadvantage, one of the main 
theorized outcomes of invisibility is marginalization (King, 1988; Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 
2008). Specifically, not being seen or heard has direct effects on inclusion in policy and debate 
on social issues, opportunities for advancement, granting of degrees of power, etc. Additionally, 
psychological well-being may be harmed as a consequence of repeatedly feeling left out 
(Fryberg & Townsend, 2008; Franklin & Boyd-Franklin, 2000). While it is beyond the scope of 
the empirical work addressed here, it would be interesting to consider how and if reducing 
reliance on category-based information through a difference focus in fact reduces 
marginalization of Black women in social spheres. It may be the case that these effects are 
limited to the lab and cognitive measures. Further, researchers need to consider what sorts of 
polices, programs, or training sessions would be appropriate to implement.  
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Conclusion 
 The goals of the current work were to investigate the role of prototypicality as an 
antecedent of invisibility and to examine methods to reduce invisibility; to increase the 
likelihood that Black women will be differentiated and individuated. While the original 
assumption was that by increasing prototypicality invisibility may be reduced, I instead suggest 
that a more direct way to reduce invisibility may be to reduce reliance on category based 
information when making judgments. By focusing on how Black women are different or unique 
from White women and/or Black men it reduces perceivers’ tendency to use the categories of 
“women” and “Black” and likewise increases visibility. The current work is the first to suggest 
and demonstrate that invisibility of Black women can be reduced. In addition, I argue that these 
processes are also applicable to similarly situated group members beyond Black women. In other 
words, focusing on differences to reduce reliance on category based information should 
theoretically also reduce invisibility of other non-prototypical group members.  
Invisibility is a unique and qualitatively different form of discrimination that may be 
particular to groups that hold multiple-subordinate identities. The bulk of the literature has been 
on experiences of invisibility, but the focus in this dissertation was on understanding (and 
reducing) perceivers’ treatment of others as invisible. I suggest considering invisibility as a form 
of discrimination offers an alternative to understand how discrimination may be uniquely 
characterized for such groups. Although much of the research on sexism and racism has 
concentrated on the prototypes of White women and Black men, it is important for researchers to 
understand and consider the unique effects that can occur from holding multiple-subordinate 
identities. I hope this work will add to the existing literature on invisibility, as well as to 
comparative thinking as a tool to reduce effects of category based judgment. Finally, I hope it 
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furthers an understanding of the processes related to invisibility among Black women and 
similarly situated groups.   
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Footnotes 
1
 To be able to compute proportions in cases when no errors were made, we followed 
conventions and changed false alarm rates of 0 to .05 (this affected 130 cases [out of 91 
participants × 4 types of targets = 364 possible]). In addition, a false alarm rate of 1 (or 6 false 
alarms out of a possible 6 for each gender/race target), was changed to .95. This only affected 2 
participants. Also per convention perfect hit rates were changed to .95 (affecting 72 cases; see 
Wickens, 2002). 
2
 Because d’ is based on the difference between hits and false alarms, we wondered 
whether the effects reported above were due to one or both components. Hits and false alarms, 
scored as proportions, were submitted to Numerical Representation × Target Race × Target 
Gender repeated measures ANOVAs, with Numerical Representation as the between-subjects 
factor. There were no significant effects on hits (all ps > .20), but the analysis of  false alarms 
revealed the significant Target Race main effect, F(1, 89) = 12.51, p  < .001, along with  a Target 
Race × Target Gender interaction, F(1, 89) = 4.18, p = .044, and the predicted three-way 
interaction, F(1, 89) = 5.05, p = .027. Like d' the pattern of results in this 3-way interaction was 
in a direction opposite to my predictions. The Target Race × Target Gender interaction was 
significant in the equal numerical representation condition, F(1, 29) =  5.56, p = .025, but not in 
the low numerical representation condition, F(1, 60) = .035, p = .85. In the equal numerical 
status condition more false alarms were committed for Black women (M = .31, SD = .25) 
compared to White women (M = .17, SD = .18; p = .001), and marginally more compared to 
Black men (M = .24, SD = .23; p = .083), and White men (M = .23, SD = .18; p = .052). But 
equal numbers of false alarms were committed for Black women (M = .20, SD = .17) compared 
to White women (M = .16, SD = .14), Black men (M = .23, SD = .18), and White men (M = .18, 
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SD = .13) in the low representation condition (all ps > .13). Also driving this 3-way interaction, 
participants committed more false alarms for Black women in the equal numerical representation 
condition compared to the low numerical representation condition, F(1, 89) = 5.51, p = .021, but 
differences in false alarms between conditions were not significant for White women, Black 
men, and White men (all ps > .17). Thus, increased recognition of Black women in the low 
numerical representation condition was driven primarily by the decrease in false alarms in this 
case.   
3
 False alarm rates of 0 were changed to .05 (this affected 140 cases [out of 102 
participants × 4 types of targets = 408 possible]). Also per convention, perfect hit rates were 
changed to .95 (affecting 90 cases; see Wickens, 2002). 
4
 Further simple effects analysis showed that participants were also particularly good at 
recognizing White women in the high overlap condition compared to both Black men, t(48) = 
2.50, p = .016, and White men, t(48) = 2.16, p = .036. In the low trait overlap condition, 
participants were better at recognizing White women, t(52) = 3.45, p = .001, and White men (M 
= 1.88, SD = .83), t(52) = 2.12, p = .039, compared to Black men.  
5
 Hits and false alarms, scored as proportions, were also submitted to Trait Overlap × 
Target Race × Target Gender repeated measures ANOVAs, with the between-subjects factor of 
Trait Overlap. The only significant effect for hits was a main effect of Target Gender, F(1, 100) 
= 5.80, p = .018. Participants had more hits for female targets (M = .80, SD = .11), than for male 
targets (M = .77, SD =.13). For false alarms, there was a significant Target Race main effect, 
F(1, 100) = 7.60, p = .007, such that participants committed more false alarms when the target 
was Black (M = .23, SD = .14) than when the target was White (M = .19, SD = .13). No other 
effects were significant. Thus, the d’ effects were not specifically driven by false alarms or hits. 
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6
The original N was 196. Thirty-five participant responses were excluded due to negative 
d's (n=24) or for failing the manipulation check (n=11). A negative d' is not interpretable and 
indicates that participants performed worse than chance or that participants could distinguish the 
signal but were doing so incorrectly (Macmillan & Creelman, 1991; Wickens, 2002). For the 
manipulation check, participants were asked at the end of the experiment to recall what job the 
photos of women they saw had. Participants that were excluded from analysis answers included 
variations of: “I was not told,” “I don’t know,” or they guessed an incorrect profession.   
7
 This study was conducted over two semesters. A manipulation check was included only 
during the second semester, thus, only 60 out of the 102 participants completed this question.  
8
 False alarm rates of 0 were converted to .05 (this affected 245 cases [out of 165 
participants × 4 types of targets = 660 possible]). In addition, a false alarm rate of 1 (or 6 false 
alarms out of a possible 6 for each gender/race target), was changed to .95. This only affected 2 
participants. Also per convention perfect hit rates were changed to .95 (affecting 131 cases; see 
Wickens, 2002). 
9
 Hits and false alarms, scored as proportions, were submitted to a Numerical 
Representation × Power × Target Race × Target Gender repeated measures ANOVAs, with the 
between-subjects factor of Numerical Representation and Power. The only significant effect on 
hits was a main effect of Target Gender, F(1, 159) = 8.22, p = .005, such that male targets (M = 
.78, SD = .15) were correctly recognized better than female targets (M = .75, SD = .17). For false 
alarms there was an effect of Target Race, F(1, 159) = 10.50, p = .001, such participants 
committed more false alarms for Black targets (M = .23, SD = .16) than White targets (M = .19, 
SD = .14). There was also a Numerical Representation × Power interaction × Target Race × 
Target Gender interaction, F( 2, 159) = 3.88, p = .023. The nature of this 4-way interaction did 
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not replicate any previous findings and did not bring any meaningful knowledge to the current 
dissertation. For this reason, it will not be discussed further.  
10
 The original N was 104. Ten participant responses were excluded due to negative d's.  
11
 False alarm rates of 0 were changed to .05 (this affected 120 cases [out of 94 
participants × 4 types of targets = 376 possible]). In addition, a false alarm rate of 1 (or 6 false 
alarms out of a possible 6 for each gender/race target), was changed to .95. This only affected 1 
participant. Also per convention, perfect hit rates were changed to .95 (affecting 81 cases; see 
Wickens, 2002). 
12
 Hits and false alarms, scored as proportions, were also submitted to Focus Prime × 
Target Race × Target Gender repeated measures ANOVAs, with the between-subjects factor of 
Focus Prime. There were no significant effect of Hits (all ps > .19), and only a significant effect 
of Target Race on false alarms, F(1, 92) = 11.53, p = .001. Participants committed more false 
alarms for Black targets (M = .25, SD = .17) than White targets (M = .20, SD = .12).  
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Figure 1. Numerical Representation of Black Women × Target Race × Target Gender interaction 
on sensitivity (d’), Study 1 
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Figure 2. Trait Overlap of Black Women compared to White women and Black men × Target 
Race × Target Gender interaction on sensitivity (d’), Study 2  
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Figure 3. Focus Prime × Target Race × Target Gender interaction on sensitivity (d’), Study 4 
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Figure 4. Focus Prime × Target (Black women vs. mean of other groups) interaction on 
sensitivity (d’), Study 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                      74 
 
 
Appendix A 
Example slides from manipulation phase of Study 1 
 
  
Example slide 1: Low numerical representation condition 
 
 
Example slide 2: Equal numerical representation condition  
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Appendix B 
 
Example slides from manipulation phase Study 2 
 
 
High trait overlap condition/White women comparison: Slide 1 shown for 7 seconds followed by 
slide 2 highlighting trait overlap for 3 seconds  
 
  
High trait overlap condition/White women and Black men comparison: Slide 1 shown for 7 
seconds followed by slide 2 highlighting trait overlap for 3 seconds  
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Appendix C 
 
Drawings for focus prime in Study 4 
 
 
 
